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Abstract
In this study, we examine disparities in financial development at the regional level in India. The major
research questions of the study are: how do we measure the level of financial development at the sub-
national level? How unequal is financial development across the states? Does it vary by ownership of
financial institutions? To explore these research questions, our study develops a composite banking devel-
opment index at the sub-national level for three different bank groups – public, private and foreign for 25
Indian states covering 1996–2015. Our findings suggest that despite reforms, banking development is sig-
nificantly higher in the leading high income and more developed regions compared to lagging ones.
Furthermore, we find that all bank groups including public banks are concentrated more in the developed
regions. Overall, over the years the position of top three and bottom three states in the aggregate banking
index have remained unchanged reflecting lop-sidedness of regional development. We also note improve-
ment in the ranking of some north-eastern states during the period 2009–15.
Key words: Banking development index; financial development; financial inclusion; India
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1. Introduction
Recent discussions on inequality have focused on increasing global income and wealth inequality
between individuals, inequality between countries and inequality among different population groups
within a country (Atkinson, 2015; Pickety, 2014; Stiglitz, 2013, 2015). Spatial inequality, i.e. inequality
over geographic regions has also been receiving some attention (Kanbur and Venables, 2005).
However, inequality in the financial sector remains less explored.
In this study, we examine financial development at the sub-national level. Our major research ques-
tions are: how do we measure the level of financial development at the sub-national level? How
unequal is the financial development across the states? Does it vary by the ownership of financial insti-
tutions? We examine these in the context of a large country, India. To explore the research questions,
our study develops a banking development index at the sub-national level for three different bank
groups – public, private and foreign for 25 Indian states covering 1996–2015. For analytical purposes
following Arora and Wondemu (2018), we group states into leading and lagging. States with per capita
incomes above the national average are leading, whereas those below are lagging (Appendix A).
India is an interesting case to examine as it presents a picture of marked diversity with the sub-
national units at different stages of development (Dreze and Sen, 2013; Frankel, 2005). Although
some states (Kerala) have development levels somewhat similar to those of developed countries, others
significantly lag.1 Since the economic reforms in 1991, regional disparities appear to have increased
significantly (Kurian, 2000).
© Millennium Economics Ltd 2021. This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence
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original work is properly cited.
1These disparities existed historically as western and southern states were ahead of other regions especially in irrigation
development and social indicators.
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Inequalities have been persistent in the level of financial development across the states. Several pol-
icies, especially those targeted at the financial sector, were adopted in the 1960s and 1970s to promote
balanced regional development (Narasimham Committee Report, 1991; RBI, 2008). These included
social control and nationalisation of banks in 1969 and 1980, investments in less developed regions,
directed lending, insistence of 60% credit–deposit ratios for rural and semi-urban areas and establish-
ment of Regional Rural Banks (RRBs).
Furthermore, financial development is crucial for the development of business and private sectors.
An International Monetary Fund (IMF) study noted that Indian firms depend significantly on external
sources of finance (Oura, 2008) and therefore, poor access to banks can limit the sources of finance for
business growth in the lagging states.
Our study contributes to the existing literature in several respects. First, our study is at the sub-
national level and overcomes some limitations of cross-country/national level studies. In a large
diverse country, sub-national picture could be very different from that at the national level. Second,
we build unique state level banking development index summarising diverse information on various
indicators. This allows comprehensive assessment of the state of financial development in Indian
states. Third, we consider three bank groups (public, private and foreign banks) separately and capture
competitive effects of different ownership of banks.
Although all banks are important in terms of financial development and their contribution to
poverty reduction and economic growth (Levine, 1997), differentiation across different bank groups
is useful because Indian public banks are guided by national policy priorities, whereas private banks
have somewhat more freedom to pursue their own markets. International banks, in contrast, are pre-
dominantly located in metropolitan cities and we wanted to examine whether their behaviour is dif-
ferent from domestic banks. Nonetheless, despite these differences all bank groups (including
foreign banks with more than 20 branches) should meet priority sector lending targets of 40% of
net bank credit (RBI, 2020a).2 Lately, the crucial role played by public banks in contributing to
financial stability especially in crisis (e.g. 2007–08 global financial crisis) has been well acknowl-
edged (Andrianova, 2012; Arora, 2017; Panizza, 2012; Yeyati et al., 2007).3 Furthermore, the
years covered in our study show different phases of India’s economic development since the 1991
reforms. Also, following existing literature (Ayyagari et al., 2020) our index combines both financial
depth (captured by credit/GDP ratio) and outreach indicators (proxied by population covered per
bank branch). Finally, our study has implications not just for India but also for other similar
large emerging economies with sub-national variations in banking development and existing
regional inequalities.
Following this Introduction, section 2 briefly presents related literature. Section 3 lays out stylised
facts on India’s financial sector. Section 4 provides methodology and outlines choice of indicators.
Section 5 presents banking development indices for public, private and foreign bank groups and dis-
cusses major findings. Finally, in section 6 conclusions and implications are discussed.
2. Literature review
On spatial and geographical inequalities, Kanbur and Venables (2005) note ‘spatial inequality is a
dimension of overall inequality, but it has added significance when spatial and regional divisions
align with political and ethnic tensions to undermine social and political stability’. Prager and
Thisse (2012) observe, ‘…while it is true that the importance of proximity to natural resources has
declined considerably…this does not mean that distance and location have disappeared from eco-
nomic life. Quite the contrary, economic geography indicates that new forces, hitherto outweighed
by natural factors, are shaping an economic landscape that, with its many barriers and inequalities,
2Priority sector includes agriculture, micro, small and medium enterprises, export credit, education, housing, social infra-
structure and others (RBI, 2020a).
3Even in post-Covid-19 economic recovery public banks are expected to play an important role (IMF, 2020).
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is anything but flat’. In the early literature, Robock (1960) had cautioned ‘Increasing attention… is
now being paid to the related problem of regional economic disparities within a country’.
Earliest studies for instance, Williamson (1965) explained that regional disparities rise in the early
stages of development and weaken in later stages. Empirically, several studies such as Démurger (2001)
and Kanbur and Zhang (2005) for China; Esmara (1975) for Indonesia; Azzoni (2001) for Brazil;
Bonet (2006) for Columbia; Yamamoto (2007) and Kim (2009) for the USA have examined regional
disparities. These studies have analysed regional disparities using different methodologies, time peri-
ods and identified different factors potentially causing disparities. For instance, Kanbur and Zhang
(2005) identify industrial output, degree of decentralisation and degree of openness as the factors
responsible for regional disparities in China. Bonet (2006) argues that poorly designed decentralisation
policies led to increase in regional disparities in Columbia. Institutional factors also could lead to
increase in income inequality as Holcombe and Boudreaux (2016) concluded in their study on market
institutions. Kim (2017) assigned divergence in legal and political institutions in explaining differences
in the level of economic development in Virginia and Massachusetts in the USA.
Similar to large countries, even small countries can have significant regional inequalities as several
papers in Felsenstein and Portnov (2005) argued. Within the United Kingdom, for example, signifi-
cant regional variations exist with a clear North-South divergence visible. Such disparities, whether
in large or small countries, can concentrate poverty in certain regions, skew intra-national migration
patterns, create the grounds for resource-based and inequality-based conflicts and militancy and pose
threats to national security in general. In the context of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), elim-
inating extreme poverty and hunger, reducing other forms of poverty and promoting inclusive and
sustainable human settlements are national policy priorities (SDGs 5 and 10). Not much literature,
however, exists on the role of financial sector in escalating or reducing regional disparities.
Theoretically, well-developed financial systems can promote economic growth, remove financing
constraints for firms, reduce poverty and provide new opportunities (Jalilian and Kirkpatrick, 2005;
Levine, 1997). Less developed financial systems, on the contrary, lead to entrenching of inequality,
loss of opportunities to the poor, less investment in enterprise growth and human capital development
(Arora, 2012; Claessens and Perotti, 2007). Economic history suggests that due to path dependence
and long-term nature of institutional evolution, in many former colonies, the present-day institutions
may still be affected by the colonial and extractive institutional architecture notwithstanding several
decades of policy interventions after Independence (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012; Greif, 2006).
Empirically, among the few studies Peng et al. (2010) examined regional finance as the cause of
regional disparities in China. Zou and He (2018) employing data on 282 Chinese cities investigated
the relationship between economic disparity and financial sector. Sharma (2008) investigated whether
regional disparities in India are due to immobility of capital. Findings show that high returns to capital
exist in low industrial districts. Regional inequality, therefore, could be reduced if financial sector is
developed further and capital is made more mobile. Rajesh Raj et al. (2014) explore whether inequal-
ities in banking services explain disparities in firm start-ups in the informal sector in India. Results
show that although availability of local bank branches had a positive impact on informal firms, the
effect was more pronounced for the large firms within the sector. Kumar (2013) in the Indian context
showed branch network having a positive impact on financial inclusion. Similarly, Zeng (2016) exam-
ined the impact of capital immobility on regional incomes and inequality. Data (from New World
Wealth 2018) on world’s top 15 wealthiest cities (including New York, London, Paris and Mumbai)
also show that almost all of them are financial centres indicating that wealth creation and financial
services may be spatially associated (due to agglomeration economies). Younas (2009), although
not focused on within country inequality, notes that institutional factors such as strength of the
legal system, investment risk and democratic accountability impacts capital mobility in developing
countries.
Above indicates that unequal financial sector has profound implications for the rest of the economy
and an inclusive financial development may provide more opportunities and reduce regional inequal-
ities. Improved access to financial services and products for the households also promotes financial
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development, contributes to economic growth, reduces income inequality, poverty and has positive
effect on household incomes (Beck & De La Torre, 2007; Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2017). Recent
years have witnessed considerable emphasis on financial inclusion by several developing and devel-
oped economies. Yet, not much is known on the level of financial development at the sub-national
level.
In the Indian context, several studies examined differences in states’ economic performance in pre-
reform and post-reform periods and observed a widening of regional disparities especially since the
1990s.4 Joumard et al. (2017) also observed increasing inter-state and rural-urban inequalities.
Poverty in all dimensions is also higher in the rural areas as the UNDP Multidimensional Poverty
Index noted that 69% of rural poor households are multidimensionally poor compared to 31% in
the urban areas (OPHI, 2017). Chancel and Piketty (2017) observed that Indian income inequality
(marked decline in the early 1940s and strong reduction in top income shares in 1950–1970s) regis-
tered a significant increase from 1980s onwards. These trends are consistent with growth episodes in
other emerging economies such as Brazil and China, both of which experienced worsening regional
inequalities as their economies began to grow after the mid-1990s (Anand et al., 2021).
Disparities also exist in the availability of infrastructure facilities and human development. Per
capita electricity consumption, for instance, was only 133.6 kW hours in Bihar, a less developed
state compared to 1,799.01 kW hours in Punjab in 2011. Other infrastructure facilities such as road
density and teledensity (number of telephone landline connections per 1,000 population) are also
low in less developed states compared to more developed and prosperous states. Of course, with
the advent of mobile phones, landlines are becoming less important, but it may still indicate some
degree of inequality especially concerning enterprises and firms. Among development indicators,
infant mortality rates vary from 12 per 1,000 live births (Kerala) to 52 per 1,000 live births
(Madhya Pradesh). A composite infrastructure index covering both dimensions – physical infrastruc-
ture (electricity consumption, road density and teledensity) and social infrastructure (human develop-
ment and quality of life indicators) for 2011–12 once again confirms considerable differences across
states (Figure 1).5
Another useful index at the sub-national level is Social Progress Index (2017) (SPI) which captures
social progress or citizens’ experience in three dimensions – basic human needs (includes nutrition,
basic medical care, water and sanitation, shelter and personal safety); well-being (includes education,
access to information, health care and environmental quality) and opportunity (captures citizens per-
sonal rights, personal freedom and choice, inclusion of different groups and access to advanced edu-
cation). This index covers outcome indicators and also reflects institutional quality at the state level
(Nirola and Sahu, 2019). In 2017 the index scores ranged from high of 68.09 (Kerala) to a low of
44.89 (Bihar). Overall, it showed that although all states have made headway in terms of social progress
over the years, considerable differences still persist. An interesting finding is that the states which have
performed well economically have not necessarily performed well in social progress (for instance
Maharashtra, Gujarat and Karnataka) and reverse in the states such as Kerala which scored highest
(68.09) despite low-economic achievements.
3. Stylised facts on Indian financial sector
Indian financial sector is largely dominated by commercial banks comprising public, private and for-
eign banks. As of March 2016, there were 27 public banks, 21 private banks, 43 foreign banks and 56
4Ahluwalia (2002); Kurian (2000); Rao et al. (1999); Sachs et al. (2002). Although a number of studies noted divergence
across the states (Rao et al., 1999; Sachs et al., 2002), some have shown evidence of absolute convergence (Cashin and Sahay,
1996; Dholakia, 1994). Some studies also noted evidence of conditional convergence (Cherodian and Thirlwall, 2015;
Purfield, 2006).
5Although the methodology followed is similar to the used in the construction of banking development indices in section
3.1, we reversed the values in minimum and maximum territories to reflect negativity of some social indicators, for instance
infant mortality rate where minimum reflects positive trend and maximum reverse.
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RRBs.6 The government continues to maintain more than the statutory minimum shareholding of
51% in all public banks (RBI, 2016).
Besides commercial banks, hosts of other financial intermediaries co-exist e.g. cooperative banks,
small payment banks, development banks and non-banking financial companies (NBFC). Total num-
ber of NBFCs registered with RBI in March 2016 was 11,682 of which 202 were deposit-taking and
11,480 non-deposit accepting. In 2014–15, NBFC assets (deposit and non-deposit taking)/GDP
ratio was only 12.9% compared to 96.4% of banking sector (Arora and Zhang, 2019). Credit intensity
measured by NBFCs credit/GDP ratio was 11.6% in 2019–20 compared to 50.7% of non-food credit
banks/GDP ratio (RBI, 2020b). Of total non-deposit accepting NBFCs, 220 are systemically important,
i.e. those with asset size greater than Rs 5 billion. Total assets of deposit accepting NBFCs was Rs 2.4
trillion in 2016 forming 14% of total NBFC assets whereas those of systemically important NBFCs
were Rs 14.8 trillion. Despite their smaller size compared to banks, NBFCs have played a crucial
role in providing financial access to rural, agricultural and small borrowers (Arora and Zhang,
2019; Mohan and Ray, 2017). Major factors behind the rise of NBFCs in the recent years include
ongoing financial sector reforms allowing entry to new entrants; unmet demand from small and
rural borrowers; risk averseness of commercial banks following high prevalence of non-performing
assets.
Development banks (almost all government owned), which played a significant role prior to 1990s
in India, have been largely closed or merged with their parent institutions in recent years. Total dis-
bursements (mostly private sector) by development banks as proportion of gross fixed capital forma-
tion in the manufacturing sector rose from 10% in 1970–71 to 36% in 1990–91 and further to 49% in
2000–01 however, declined sharply to just 6% in 2005–06 (Nayyar, 2015). Only three development
banks (mainly refinancing institutions) still exist – National Bank for Agriculture & Rural Bank,
National Housing Bank and Small Industries Development Bank of India. Furthermore, several
urban and rural cooperative banks exist, however these are very much localised. In this study we, there-
fore, focus on commercial banks as they are the major financial intermediaries and are well spread out
across the country.
Tables 1–3 show disparities in the Indian banking sector. For analytical brevity, we use the
terms leading and lagging regions, where leading have income above the national income average,
whereas lagging have income below that threshold (Appendix A). Table 1 reveals disparities in
Figure 1. Composite infrastructure index of states.
6As on March 2021, the Indian banking sector consists of 12 public banks (post-merger and consolidation of public
banks), 22 private banks, 46 foreign banks, 10 small finance banks, 2 payment banks and 43 RRBs.
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bank branch density across the leading and lagging regions. As there is considerable disparity in the
economic development of states, deposits and credit per capita are significantly higher in the leading
regions compared to lagging ones (Table 2). Furthermore, almost all bank groups (public, private and
foreign) are concentrated in terms of deposit and credit, more in the leading and developed regions
(Table 3).










branches per sq. km
1 2 3 4 5
Leading 42,033 11.2 4,053 0.04
Lagging 23,029 19.1 2,512 0.02
Mean 32,531 15.15 3,282.5 0.03
SD 13,437.86 5.59 1,089.65 0.01
CV (%) 41.3 36.9 33.2 47.1
Source: Computed by authors. Derived from Reserve Bank of India Publications and CSO data on state Gross Domestic Product.
Note: Excludes union territories.













1 2 3 4 5 6
Leading 42,033 138.4 98.5 40,024 28,849
Lagging 23,029 100.6 45.3 15,961 7,186
Mean 32,531 119.5 71.9 27,992.5 18,017.5
SD 13,437.86 26.73 37.62 17,015.11 15,318.05
CV (%) 41.3 22.4 52.3 60.8 85.0
NDP, net domestic product.
Source: Computed by authors. Derived from Reserve Bank of India Publications and CSO data on state Gross Domestic Product.
Note: Excludes union territories.























1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Leading 42,033 0.74 0.17 0.05 1.05 0.25 0.06
Lagging 23,029 0.35 0.06 0.00 0.78 0.13 0.01
Mean 35,420.83 0.90 0.10 122.79 1.05 0.21 0.03
SD 15,043.76 1.01 0.08 180.84 0.30 0.15 0.04
CV (%) 42.5 112.3 80.3 147.3 28.7 72.4 144.5
NDP, net domestic product.
Source: Computed by authors. Derived from Reserve Bank of India Publications and CSO data on state Gross Domestic Product.
Note: Excludes union territories.
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4. Methodology and data specification
Many studies have used indicators such as M3/GDP (broad money or liquid liabilities) or private
credit/GDP to proximate financial development. In recent studies, Arcand et al. (2012) use credit/
GDP ratio, whereas Dabla-Norris and Srivisal (2013) employ private credit/GDP from banks and
other financial institutions to investigate impact of macroeconomic volatility. Ang (2010) to represent
overall financial sector development considered claims on private sector/GDP; M3/GDP; share of
commercial bank assets in the sum of commercial and central bank assets.
Financial development is, however, a multidimensional concept encompassing different dimen-
sions e.g. outreach, size, depth, stability and access to finance (Čihák et al., 2012). Lone or a couple
of measures cannot capture the complexity of the financial system (Svirydzenka, 2016). As Creane
et al. (2003) observed:
Financial sector development is a multifaceted concept, encompassing not only monetary aggre-
gates and interest rates (or rates of return) but also financial openness, regulation and supervi-
sion, technological advances, degree of competition, and institutional capacity such as the
strength of creditor rights.
This multidimensionality of financial development is also captured by Svirydzenka (2016) who
defined financial development as:
combination of depth (size and liquidity of markets), access (ability of individuals and companies
to access financial services), and efficiency (ability of institutions to provide financial services at
low cost and with sustainable revenues, and the level of activity of capital markets).
As single indicator is unable to capture the full extent of financial development, we build composite
banking index for 25 states for 1996–2015. Following the literature, we follow similar methodology
followed by UNDP in building its human development index and other UNDP indices (Arora,
2012). The detailed methodology and choice of indicators are given below.
Methodology
We denote each bank group by Dj where j = 1…J, and therefore, in our case j = 3 (public, private and
foreign). Each dimension consists of n number of determinants which we denote by Xi, and i = 1 to n.





Here, the notations Xkij1, X
k
ij2 and Xij3, respectively, represent actual (1) observed value, minimum
value (2) and maximum value (3) for ith determinant in jth dimension. The minimum and maximum
values, termed as ‘goalposts’ (UNDP, 2009), are minimum and maximum values of each variable in
different states. Now, we use simple arithmetic average as follows to determine the value for each
dimension Dj. We use arithmetic average instead of geometric mean mainly because of several dimen-
sions having values of zeros or close to zero observations in our database particularly for foreign
banks. Arithmetic mean takes zeros or very low values into account implying that high values perfectly
substitute for low or zero values. In contrast, geometric mean does not proceed with zero or near zero
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Next, we assign equal weights (denoted by αj for dimension j to each dimension). We compute the
banking development index for each bank group at the sub-national level as follows:




There are number of missing values on both deposits and credit for foreign banks especially in the
lagging states.7 This clearly indicates that foreign banks are very picky and prefer locating in developed
and more prosperous regions, indulge in so-called ‘cream skimming’ and provide finance to selected
very profitable firms (Gormley, 2010; Sarma and Prashad, 2016; Sharda et al., 2014). They conse-
quently avoid spreading to rural or lagging regions resulting in negligible or no deposit/credit values.
We have set the values to zero if no data are available. This is not ideal but in the circumstances with
limited data we believe this is a reasonable compromise.
Choice of indicators
Some studies have built financial development indices at the cross-country level and national level.
World Economic Forum (2012) used seven dimensions – institutional environment, business environ-
ment, financial stability, banking financial services, non-banking financial services, financial markets,
financial access and constructed financial development index for 62 countries. Hong Kong SAR scored
highest at 5.3 out of 7, whereas Venezuela scored lowest (2.37). India ranked 40 (3.3) out of 62 and
slightly ahead of Peru, Turkey and Mexico and behind Slovak Republic and Poland.
At the cross-country level, Arora (2012) built multidimensional financial development index includ-
ing dimensions – banking development; financial freedom; regulation and supervision and institutional
environment. The indicators included M2/GDP, non-performing loans, interest rate spread, domestic
private sector credit, value of stocks traded/GDP, number of bank branches and ATMs per 100,000 peo-
ple, financial freedom from Heritage Foundation, bank capital/assets ratio, credit depth of information
index and strength of legal rights index. Svirydzenka (2016) developed financial development index for
183 countries for 1980 to 2013 capturing depth, access and efficiency dimensions.
At the sub-national level, time series bank group data on many indicators usually employed in
cross-country studies are not available. We have come across only one study which has attempted
to construct a banking index to measure the outreach of banking services across different states of
India. Pal (2009) constructed a banking index for 14 major states combining indicators on access
and banking services usage to arrive at the level of banking development. Our index differs from
Pal (2009) as it covers 25 states, includes increased number of years and unlike Pal (2009) we build
separate indices for public, private and foreign banks.
As we focus on banks and different bank groups, we only consider banking indicators and
construct indices for the three bank groups separately (something not done in Pal, 2009). At the
sub-national level for different bank groups and years, data are only available for credit, deposit
and population per bank branch. Following other studies, we, therefore, focus on above three variables
(Degryse and Ongena, 2005; Jayaratne and Strahan, 1996). We do not have bank group data on other
dimensions for instance, efficiency and stability of the financial system (average staff costs per branch,
or non-performing assets at the state level). Nonetheless, our choice of indicators, constrained by data
availability, reflects depth and outreach of banking services in different Indian states.
In this study, we have captured to some extent financial development since the initiation of eco-
nomic reforms covering 1997 east Asian financial crisis, 2001 Millennium and Dot.Com bubble
and 2007–08 global financial crisis. However, we do not aim to identify or isolate specific effects of
each of those events.
7There is no selection bias in our data selection strategy. Data are equally available for both developed and developing
states. In case of foreign banks (which form a miniscule proportion of total credit and deposits anyway) data are missing
for lagging states because they avoid locating (or providing financial services) to these regions hence, data may not exist.
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We construct composite indices for different bank groups in 25 states considering three broad indi-
cators – deposits; credit and population per bank branch reflecting financial system’s depth and out-
reach. Credit indicators include per capita bank credit; credit/state output and number of credit
accounts per 1,000 people. Deposit indicators are deposits/state output; deposit accounts per capita
(number of deposit accounts per 1,000 people) and per capita bank deposit. Although deposits reflect
public’s trust in the banking system, sensitivity to interest rate, relative liquidity, resource allocation
and technological innovation; provision of bank credit too demonstrates various functions performed
by the financial system (Levine, 1997). Close access to bank branches also matters in credit demand
and provision of credit by the banks (Jayaratne and Strahan, 1996). However, although a higher bank
credit/GDP ratio indicates financial sector’s depth and improved financial development, yet this
focuses only on the size (quantity) of credit regardless of credit quality. Nonetheless, depth and out-
reach are standard indicators adopted by other studies too (Ayyagari, et al., 2020).
Our data cover the period 1996–2015 and is sourced from annual publications of RBI for banking
indicators and Central Statistical Organisation for state output. Data available on credit for each bank
group relate to total credit and do not distinguish between public and private credit.
5. Results
Bank group indices for public, private and foreign banks for each state for 1996–2008 and 2009–2015
are shown in Tables 4 and 5.8 As the aggregate banking index shows (column 6, Table 4), Maharashtra
(western region) has outperformed all other states followed by Tamilnadu, Karnataka and Kerala
(southern region). An interesting observation was high presence of public banks in agriculturally pros-
perous state, Punjab, higher even than the developed and well-banked state, Maharashtra. A rapid
increase in public bank branches followed by manifold increase in deposits and credit also took
place in Punjab during 1996–2008 (Kaur and Silony, 2011). However, the state has not performed
well in the post-reform period and its economic growth has decelerated due to several factors such
as a lack of technological breakthroughs, decline in public expenditure particularly development
expenditure, low human capital development and crisis in the agricultural sector (Shergill and
Kaur, 2019; Singh and Singh, 2002).
During 2009–15 as well, the top four states continue to be Maharashtra followed by three southern states
Tamilnadu, Karnataka and Kerala (Table 5). Although Punjab’s overall ranking remained the same as in
1996–2008, in terms of composition the proportion of public banks declined with a slight increase in private
banks during this period. Overall, the position of top three and bottom three states in aggregate banking
index has remained unchanged reflecting a lack of convergence across the states, lop-sidedness of regional
development and persistence in regional disparities (Joumard, et al., 2017; Kumar, 2013).
An interesting finding is improvement in the ranking of some north-eastern states (Arunachal
Pradesh, Tripura, Mizoram and Meghalaya) during 2009–15, although most still fall in the lagging
group. Population covered per bank branch (public and private banks) declined steadily in these states
showing increased government emphasis on enhancing financial inclusion (Figure 2).
Following Sarma and Pais (2011), we grouped states into four categories: those with indices
value <0.1, low (0.10–0.24), medium (0.25–0.49) and high banking development values (>0.5). In
1996–2008, only four states had high financial development and at least 14 states fell into low to very
low banking development group (Figure 3). There were marginal changes during 2009–15 as states
with high financial development declined to three instead of four earlier. The number of states, however,
falling in low to very low banking development group declined to 10 as financial development improved
in few states reflecting increased governmental focus on financial inclusion in the recent years.
Furthermore, banking presence is far higher in leading states compared to lagging states (Tables 6
and 7). All bank groups, including public banks, are inclined towards leading regions compared to
8We also computed regional indices of banking development for public, private and foreign banks. The results are not
reported here due to the lack of space and can be obtained on request.
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lagging. These trends prevail in both time periods.9 This finding is especially surprising considering
public banks are viewed as harbingers of economic development and overcome problems of market
Table 4. Ranking of states in aggregate banking indices (1996–2008)
States














1 2 3 4 5 6
Maharashtra 0.824 0.748 1.000 0.857 1
Tamil Nadu 0.676 0.613 0.537 0.609 2
Karnataka 0.766 0.471 0.478 0.572 3
Kerala 0.719 0.814 0.169 0.567 4
Punjab 0.996 0.259 0.177 0.477 5
Andhra Pradesh 0.592 0.325 0.170 0.362 8
Gujarat 0.578 0.306 0.182 0.355 9
Haryana 0.553 0.241 0.245 0.346 10
Himachal Pradesh 0.770 0.167 0.125 0.354 11
Arunachal Pradesh 0.333 0.141 0.021 0.165 18
J&K 0.147 0.991 0.076 0.405 6
West Bengal 0.461 0.234 0.447 0.381 7
Uttar Pradesh 0.389 0.181 0.078 0.216 12
Rajasthan 0.270 0.263 0.106 0.213 13
Madhya Pradesh 0.404 0.173 0.052 0.210 14
Meghalaya 0.438 0.156 0.023 0.206 15
Orissa 0.404 0.127 0.051 0.194 16
Jharkhand 0.408 0.149 0.001 0.186 17
Assam 0.229 0.106 0.121 0.152 19
Tripura 0.367 0.086 0.001 0.151 20
Chattisgarh 0.259 0.157 0.027 0.148 21
Mizoram 0.278 0.094 0.000 0.124 22
Bihar 0.349 0.002 0.002 0.118 23
Nagaland 0.032 0.142 0.055 0.076 24
Manipur 0.000 0.002 0.001 25
Mean 0.416 0.188 0.116 0.238
SD 0.256 0.276 0.224 0.199
CV 61.5 146.7 192.6 83.7
Source: Computed by authors.
9Other studies have also shown that, unlike common perception, public banks like private banks prefer locating their
branches in high-income developed areas (Zhang et al., 2021).
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failure in financial sector and finance socially valuable projects in less developed regions and rural
areas (Yeyati et al., 2005). Prior to 1991, Indian public banks have played a significant role in nation-
wide banking spread, reduction in rural poverty and increase in rural output (Burgess & Pande, 2005;
Arora, 2017). In the post-reform period after 1991, there is evidence of public banks having reduced
Table 5. Ranking of states in aggregate banking indices (2009–15)
States














1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Maharashtra 1.000 0.994 1.000 0.998 1 1
Tamil Nadu 0.769 0.676 0.568 0.671 2 2
Karnataka 0.709 0.460 0.568 0.579 3 3
Kerala 0.650 0.643 0.152 0.482 4 4
Punjab 0.842 0.333 0.148 0.441 8 5
Andhra Pradesh 0.848 0.373 0.207 0.476 5 8
Gujarat 0.489 0.333 0.179 0.334 11 9
Haryana 0.555 0.373 0.256 0.395 10 10
Himachal Pradesh 0.708 0.180 0.444 7 11
Arunachal Pradesh 0.378 0.135 0.256 15 18
J&K 0.020 0.914 0.467 6 6
West Bengal 0.630 0.305 0.294 0.410 9 7
Uttar Pradesh 0.321 0.140 0.111 0.191 20 12
Rajasthan 0.249 0.241 0.119 0.203 18 13
Madhya Pradesh 0.315 0.170 0.102 0.196 19 14
Meghalaya 0.367 0.176 0.272 12 15
Orissa 0.422 0.197 0.112 0.244 16 16
Jharkhand 0.320 0.147 0.234 17 17
Assam 0.214 0.138 0.202 0.185 21 19
Tripura 0.398 0.128 0.263 13 20
Chattisgarh 0.262 0.171 0.079 0.171 22 21
Mizoram 0.351 0.174 0.262 14 22
Bihar 0.172 0.000 0.052 0.075 24 23
Nagaland 0.104 0.179 0.141 23 24
Manipur 0.011 0.114 0.063 25 25
Mean 0.44 0.31 0.26 0.34
SD 0.27 0.25 0.25 0.21
CV 60.21 81.72 96.54 61.25
Source: Computed by authors.
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their presence in lagging states through rationalisation of bank branches including rural branches and
fall in credit (Kohli, 1999; Narayana, 2000; Shete, 2002).10
We also examined whether public banks could be crowding out private and foreign banks, and
whether that would have an impact on states banking index rankings. The rankings excluding (and
including) public banks are shown in Tables 8 and 9.
Some interesting observations from above exercise are: ranking of top end and bottom end states
remains nearly the same in both rankings. However, some states – Punjab, Andhra Pradesh, Uttar
Pradesh and Tripura – slip in rankings excluding PSBs showing the higher presence of public
banks in these states. In contrast, some states (Jammu & Kashmir, Rajasthan, Assam and
Nagaland) have jumped in rankings excluding public banks.
Figure 2. Population covered per bank branch in selected north-Eastern states.
Figure 3. Banking development across the states.
10Another development in 1991 was the discontinuation of branch licensing policy implemented during the years 1977 to
1990 which required banks to open new bank branches only when they set up four new bank branches in unbanked locations
(mainly rural and semi-urban areas).
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As mentioned elsewhere, some economically well-performing states had not performed well in the
SPI. For instance, a developed state – Maharashtra, which tops in the banking development index in
2015 – slips to 7th rank in the SPI. Quite the reverse, Mizoram (north-eastern state) ranking 12th in
Table 6. Breakdown of banking indices – leading and lagging states 1996–2008
Year
Public banks Private banks Foreign banks
Leading Lagging Leading Lagging Leading Lagging
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1996 0.658 0.315 0.378 0.219 0.276 0.100
1997 0.625 0.305 0.410 0.219 0.306 0.102
1998 0.661 0.311 0.336 0.227 0.368 0.127
1999 0.645 0.274 0.503 0.238 0.308 0.192
2000 0.643 0.287 0.395 0.225 0.300 0.118
2001 0.639 0.260 0.363 0.202 0.341 0.156
2002 0.627 0.278 0.420 0.192 0.265 0.096
2003 0.665 0.298 0.392 0.192 0.345 0.093
2004 0.686 0.296 0.421 0.199 0.383 0.088
2005 0.731 0.325 0.455 0.222 0.390 0.131
2006 0.751 0.310 0.425 0.202 0.395 0.105
2007 0.748 0.285 0.451 0.209 0.355 0.082
2008 0.773 0.277 0.472 0.220 0.316 0.067
Mean 0.681 0.294 0.417 0.213 0.334 0.112
SD 0.052 0.019 0.046 0.014 0.043 0.033
CV (%) 7.6 6.5 11.0 6.8 12.8 29.8
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Table 7. Breakdown of banking indices – leading and lagging states 2009–15
Public banks Private banks Foreign banks
Year Leading Lagging Leading Lagging Leading Lagging
2009 0.645 0.245 0.401 0.204 0.393 0.115
2010 0.712 0.285 0.429 0.204 0.303 0.066
2011 0.700 0.288 0.435 0.202 0.409 0.132
2012 0.720 0.295 0.457 0.211 0.405 0.129
2013 0.707 0.264 0.482 0.223 0.398 0.136
2014 0.710 0.262 0.482 0.225 0.404 0.131
2015 0.669 0.302 0.464 0.222 0.381 0.228
Mean 0.695 0.277 0.450 0.213 0.385 0.134
SD 0.027 0.021 0.030 0.010 0.037 0.048
CV 3.95 7.46 6.67 4.73 9.68 35.79
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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financial development, scores much higher at 4 in social progress rankings. Overall, a positive correl-
ation (0.53) exists between the banking development index and SPI. It may be worth mentioning that
our objective is not to examine causality, rather we aim only to measure and understand states finan-
cial development (and their differences).
The divergence in banking development between leading and lagging regions has in fact, increased
over the years, although it has slightly narrowed from 2014 onwards and is evident across all bank
groups (Figures 4a and 4b).
Per capita credit has been much higher to leading regions. Banks also invest in state government
securities and including credit indicates total flow of funds to states. Once again, the leading states
have retained their position in terms of these investments. Another indicator to examine diverse
flow of funds across the states is credit–deposit ratio (C/D ratio). The concept indicates the ‘credit
Table 8. Ranking of states excluding/including public banks (average 1996–2008)
Ranking of states excluding PSBs Ranking of states including PSBs
States Ranking States Ranking
Maharashtra 1 (0) Maharashtra 1
Tamilnadu 2 (0) Tamil Nadu 2
Jammu & Kashmir 3 (+3) Karnataka 3
Kerala 4 (0) Kerala 4
Karnataka 5 (−2) Punjab 5
West Bengal 6 (+1) Jammu & Kashmir 6
Andhra Pradesh 7 (+1) West Bengal 7
Gujarat 8 (+1) Andhra Pradesh 8
Haryana 9 (+1) Gujarat 9
Punjab 10 (−4) Haryana 10
Rajasthan 11 (+2) Himachal Pradesh 11
Meghalaya 12 (+3) Uttar Pradesh 12
Himachal Pradesh 13 (−2) Rajasthan 13
Nagaland 14 (+10) Madhya Pradesh 14
Uttar Pradesh 15 (−3) Meghalaya 15
Arunachal Pradesh 16 (+2) Odishha 16
Madhya Pradesh 17 (−3) Jharkhand 17
Assam 18 (+1) Arunachal Pradesh 18
Jharkhand 19 (−2) Assam 19
Chattisgarh 20 (+1) Tripura 20
Odissha 21 (−5) Chattisgarh 21
Mizoram 22 (0) Mizoram 22
Tripura 23 (−3) Bihar 23
Bihar 24 (−1) Nagaland 24
Manipur 25 (0) Manipur 25
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Note: Figures in brackets show slippages (−) and gains (+) compared to rankings including PSBs.
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direction of banks and is used as a credit efficiency indicator for analyzing the role of banks in pro-
moting productive sectors and contributing to economic growth’ (RBI, 2003, 2005: 77). In 2008, the C/
D ratio ranged between 27.3 in Bihar, a less developed and high poverty state, and 143.3 in
Tamilnadu.11
Differences in property rights enforcement across states could be another factor which may be
influencing banks in their location and lending decisions, as emphasised by De Soto (2000).12
Considerable evidence exists on secure property rights and its positive impact on per capita income,
investment opportunities and efficient allocation of resources (Acemoglu et al., 2001; Field, 2007;
Table 9. Ranking of states excluding/including public banks (average 2009–15)
Ranking of states excluding PSBs Ranking of states including PSBs
States Ranking States Ranking
Maharashtra 1 (0) Maharashtra 1
Jammu & Kashmir 2 (+4) Tamilnadu 2
Tamilnadu 3 (−1) Karnataka 3
Karnataka 4 (−1) Kerala 4
Kerala 5 (−1) AP 5
Haryana 6 (+4) J&K 6
West Bengal 7 (+2) HP 7
Andhra Pradesh 8 (−3) Punjab 8
Gujarat 9 (+2) West Bengal 9
Punjab 10 (−2) Haryana 10
Rajasthan 11 (+7) Gujarat 11
Himachal Pradesh 12 (−5) Meghalaya 12
Nagaland 13 (+10) Tripura 13
Meghalaya 14 (−2) Mizoram 14
Mizoram 15 (−1) Arunachal Pradesh 15
Assam 16 (+5) Orissa 16
Orissa 17 (−1) Jharkhand 17
Jharkhand 18 (−1) Rajasthan 18
Madhya Pradesh 19 (0) MP 19
Arunachal Pradesh 20 (−5) UP 20
Tripura 21 (−8) Assam 21
Uttar Pradesh 22 (−2) Chattisgarh 22
Chattisgarh 23 (−1) Nagaland 23
Manipur 24 (+1) Bihar 24
Bihar 25 (−1) Manipur 25
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Note: Figures in brackets show slippages (−) and gains (+) compared to rankings including PSBs.
11This is also heavily influenced by the presence of metropolitan region. For instance, the C/D ratio of Maharashtra
(excluding Mumbai) falls to 50.4%, which is even lower than the ratio of less developed states, Rajasthan and Orissa.
12We thank our reviewers for bringing this point to our attention.
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Hornbeck, 2010). Furthermore, several studies have highlighted that institutional factors such as
enforcement of property rights and legal rights play an important role in credit allocation (Kimura,
2011; Rao, 2020). For instance, Rao (2020) in her cross-sectional study on judicial presence ( judge
occupancy) and its impact on credit allocation in 195 Indian districts found that in districts with
higher judicial capacity, inefficient credit allocation such as loans to defaulting firms was lower.
The study also showed that ‘one percentage point increase in the average prior period judge occupancy
decreases outstanding loan by 0.5%’. Zhang et al. (2021) too found that region specific factors influ-
ence the location of bank branches in India.
Furthermore, land being a state subject in India, land regulations have varied from state to state
(Banerjee and Iyer, 2005; Besley and Burgess, 2000; Bolhuis et al., 2020). For instance, land tenancy
laws vary across India due to combination of historical land tenure systems and land being a state sub-
ject since independence (Bolhuis et al., 2020). However, despite reforms this has led to several ineffi-
ciencies and persistence of informal, insecure, short-term tenancies impacting their access to formal
credit (Bolhuis et al., 2020).
Figure 4a. Banking development in leading and lagging states during 1996–2008.
Figure 4b. Banking development in leading and lagging states during 2009–15.
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In order to examine disparities in regional banking development even furthermore, we compute
Gini coefficients for banking development indices across the states for public and private banks for
1996 to 2015. The value of Gini lies between 0 and 1. Zero value implies that financial development
across the states is perfectly equal, whereas 1 indicates a state of perfect inequality as financial devel-
opment exists only in one state. Gini coefficient measures deviations from equal distribution, with a











Here, N is the number of states and fd is the financial development of the ith state. The Gini coeffi-
cients for public and private banks so estimated are plotted in Figure 5.
We further estimated the coefficient of variation (CV), the simplest and most commonly used
among various methods of dispersion. The CV in financial development across the states for 1996
to 2015 for all three bank groups is shown in Figure 6. Generally, a stable trend is observed except
Figure 5. Disparity (Gini coefficient) in banking development across states.
Figure 6. CV across the states.
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for foreign banks, however, there is an evidence of a slight decline in recent period across all the bank
groups. Regarding foreign banks, their entry was highly regulated until 1994 when under WTO
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) the licences issued to open new branches increased
from initially five to 12 in 1998. The total number of foreign bank branches declined in 2003 and 2004
to 219 (from 251 in 2002) rising again to 229 in 2008 and further to 286 in 2018. The fall in the num-
ber of foreign bank branches in 2003 was mainly due to the closure of some banks and merger of
Standard Chartered Grindlays Bank Ltd. with Indian branches of Standard Chartered Bank (Sharda
et al., 2014). Global financial crisis of 2008 also affected the performance of both foreign and private
banks as their credit declined and flight of deposits to public banks took place (Acharya and Kulkarni,
2012; Eichengreen and Gupta, 2012). As Eichengreen and Gupta (2012) note, ‘deposit reallocation
from the foreign banks was statistically as sharp as from the domestic private banks; and the credit
growth slowdown from the foreign banks was also comparable to that of the Indian private banks’.
As Svirydzenka (2016) observes, ‘financial development is not (added) linear process. Indeed, like
with economic development, some countries go through stages of development, but then regress’.
Overall, banking development across the Indian states has progressed (Figure 7), although it was influ-
enced by the trend in public banks. The country’s banking sector remained predominantly in the pub-
lic sector with public banks accounting for 72.1% of total banking assets even as in 2014,
notwithstanding the marginal decline in ownership over the years. The Government of India continues
to hold more than the stipulated 51% shareholding in all the public banks, despite a decline in the
stake in some of them in recent years. Even as in 2020 government shareholding in public banks
ranges from 57.9 to 97.4% (RBI, 2020b). On the contrary, this period was also marked by the entry
of new private banks. Although some private banks existed prior to reforms, the entry of new ones
was largely initiated from 1993 as 10 new private banks were set up. In the early 2000s, two large devel-
opment finance institutions were also converted into banking institutions.
6. Conclusion
To summarise, our study started with the research questions: how do we measure financial develop-
ment at the sub-national level? How unequal is the financial development across the states, and does it
vary by ownership of financial institutions? We examined the extent of disparities in financial devel-
opment at the sub-national level as a step towards understanding the financial dimension of regional
disparities in the Indian context. As a large emerging economy, India is particularly an interesting case
Figure 7. Banking development during 1996–2015.
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to examine as it is not only a large federal economy with sub-national units at varying stages of devel-
opment, but the ownership of its financial sector is also quite skewed and diverse.
To investigate the extent of financial deepening at the sub-national level further, our study builds
composite banking development indices for public, private and foreign banks for 25 Indian states for
the years 1996 to 2015. We have four major findings. First, over the years, the position of top three
and bottom three states in the aggregate banking index has remained unchanged. Second, our results
show that banking development is much higher in the leading states (i.e. leading in terms of per capita
income and physical and social infrastructure) compared to the lagging states and this divergence has not
narrowed over the years. Third, just like other bank groups, the presence of public banks is much higher
in the leading states. In another study, our research too showed that contrary to general perception,
public banks consider regional and economic activity of region in locating their bank branches
(Zhang et al., 2021). Finally, an interesting finding is improvement in index scores in the recent years
for some states including those in the north-east reflecting some early impact of recent drive on financial
inclusion. We reiterate that our objective in this study is to examine key features of sub-national financial
system and not examine endogeneity. Nonetheless, the indices could be used to carry out rigorous
growth regressions to test the importance of banking access to convergence within India.
Overall, our analysis on the unevenness in the spread of financial sector development in the Indian
states and its association with regional endowments indicates that regional development strategies are
required to improve states’ economic development.
Specific policies are needed to improve financial development in lagging regions. This requires dif-
ferent approaches for public and private sector banks. We believe it is difficult to force foreign banks to
increase their operations in lagging states considering that they also face several constraints and tighter
regulations on branch expansion (Sharda et al., 2014). It is quite possible that their products are at
present geared towards high-net-worth households and formal sector firms (or cream skimming).
They have the potential to come up with innovative products to capture huge market in India
where there is a gap for efficient and less bureaucratic form of banking, but at present it appears
that foreign banks do not see themselves doing this any sooner perhaps due to complexity of state
level operations and transaction entry costs.13 That does not mean the market should not be open
for entry by foreign banks but just that they are unlikely to be venturing into that segment of banking.
As can be anticipated, private banks appear to be more risk averse than public banks leaving them to
take care of less developed regions and rural sectors. This suggests that public banks, despite their high
presence in leading states (as our results showed) are nonetheless locked into a sort of low-level equi-
librium trap with a primary responsibility to provide banking services in the lagging regions. The pro-
blems of information asymmetry are high in this sector increasing the possibilities of moral hazard
and proportion of non-performing loans. This suggests that some important reforms are needed
for lagging states to converge and for financial development to have significant impact of extreme pov-
erty in India and thus contribute to SDGs.
Recent drive to increase financial inclusion and financial development has remained mainly supply
centric and neglects demand side barriers for instance, low incomes of many households leading to
low demand for formal financial services, financial illiteracy, travelling costs to the bank to conduct
banking transactions and poor education in general. Although there are efforts to formalise the finan-
cial sector, overall employment in India remains dominated by unorganised sector and merely forcing
people to use formal financial channels may not work unless it is accompanied by education, aware-
ness and safeguards for small enterprises and informal sector businesses to be part of the formal finan-
cial system. The demand for working capital and huge seasonality of such enterprises and smoothing
this out through appropriate products remains a huge challenge for formal financial models especially
given the nature of distribution of risks and limited penetration of insurance including business
13Foreign banks face strict guidelines in setting up branches in the north-eastern states of the country (Sarma and Prashad,
2016). Also, despite relaxing of norms on wholly owned subsidiaries by RBI, no foreign bank still operates as wholly owned
subsidiary in India (RBI, 2016).
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insurance services. Addressing these would increase demand for financial services, improve financial
inclusion and increase banking development (Tulasi et al., 2017). At the same time, as our analysis
showed the crucial role played by institutional factors such as differences in land systems across the
states historically which has shaped and influenced economic development including access to credit
of lagging states cannot be overlooked (Banerjee and Iyer, 2005; Bolhuis et al., 2020). This implies that
demand alone may not be a sole barrier to accessing financial services.
As developing countries are adopting several measures to improve financial development and
financial inclusion (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2018), national level efforts alone may not be adequate
as they may fail to redress underlying inequalities at the local/regional level. More focused approach
is needed at the sub-national/local levels to achieve increased financial development (Fafchamps and
Schündeln, 2013). This is especially relevant for large federal economies.
Acknowledgements. We gratefully thank the three anonymous referees and editor, Prof Geoffrey Hodgson for very valu-
able and constructive feedback on our paper. We also acknowledge comments and feedback received from the participants of
3rd Development Economics Conference, 17–19 June 2019, University of Lincoln, Lincoln, UK; Global Inequalities: Annual
Conference of Development Studies Association, University of Manchester and Annual Conference of Regional Studies
Association, held at Trinity College, Dublin.
References
Acemoglu, D., S. Johnson and J. A. Robinson (2001), ‘The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical
investigation’, American Economic Review, 91(5): 1369–1401.
Acemoglu, D. and J. A. Robinson (2012),Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty (1st ed.), New York:
Crown.
Acharya, V. and N. Kulkarni (2012), State Ownership and Systemic Risk: Evidence from the Indian Financial Sector during
2007–09. International Growth Centre.
Ahluwalia, M. (2002), ‘State Level Performance Under Economic Reforms in India’, in A. O. Krueger (ed.), Economic Policy
Reforms in the Indian Economy, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, pp. 91–125.
Anand P. B., Fennell, S., Comim F. (2021), ‘BRICS and Emerging Economies: An Assessment’, in P. B. Anand, S. Fennell and
F. Comim (eds), The Handbook of BRICS and Emerging Economies, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 3–60.
Andrianova, S. (2012), ‘Public Banks and Financial stability’, Economics Letters, 116(2012): 86–88.
Ang, J. B. (2010), ‘Finance and Inequality: The Case of India’, Southern Economic Journal, 76(3): 738–761.
Arcand, J.-L., E. Berkes and U. Panizza (2012), Too Much Finance? IMF Working Paper 12/161. Washington: International
Monetary Fund (June).
Arora, R. U. (2012), ‘Financial Inclusion and Human Capital in Developing Asia: The Australian Connection’, Third World
Quarterly, 33(1): 177–197.
Arora, R. (2017), ‘Government Intervention and Financial Sector Development’, in G. Gianluigi (ed.), Development Finance:
Opportunities and Challenges, London: Palgrave, pp. 53–78.
Arora, R. U. and K. Wondemu (2018), ‘Do Public Sector Banks Promote Regional Growth: Evidence from an Emerging
Economy’, Review of Urban and Regional Development Studies, 30(1): 66–87.
Arora, R. U. and Q. Zhang (2019), ‘Banking in Shadows: Evidence From Emerging Economies, China and India’, Australian
Economic History Review, 59(1), 103–131, doi:10.1111/aehr.12167.
Atkinson, A. (2015), Inequality: What can be Done, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Ayyagari, M., T. Beck and M. Hoseini (2020), ‘Finance, Law and Poverty: Evidence from India’, Journal of Corporate Finance,
60(c): 1–25.
Azzoni, C. R. (2001), ‘Economic Growth and Regional Income Inequality in Brazil’, The Annals of Regional Science, 35(1):
133–152.
Banerjee, A. and L. Iyer (2005), ‘History, Institutions, and Economic Performance: The Legacy of Colonial Land Tenure
Systems in India’, American Economic Review, 95(4): 1190–1213, September.
Beck, T. and A. de la Torre (2007), ‘The Basic Analytics of Access to Financial Services’, Financial Markets, Institutions and
Instruments, 16: 79–117.
Besley, T. and R. Burgess (2000), ‘Land Reform, Poverty Reduction, and Growth: Evidence from India’, The Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 115(2): 389–430.
Bolhuis, M., S. Rachapalli, and D. Restuccia (2020), Misallocation in Indian Agriculture, retrieved from https://www.econom-
ics.utoronto.ca/diegor/research/BRR_India_paper_v5.pdf
Bonet, J. (2006), ‘Fiscal Decentralization and Regional Income Disparities: Evidence from the Colombian Experience’, The
Annals of Regional Science, 40(3): 661–676.
20 Rashmi U. Arora and P. B. Anand
https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1744137421000291
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 2.97.224.155, on 14 Jul 2021 at 08:44:48, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
Burgess, R. and R. Pande (2005), ‘Do Rural Banks Matter? Evidence from the Indian Social Banking Experiment’, The
American Economic Review, 95(3): 780–795.
Cashin, P. and R. Sahay (1996), ‘Regional Economic Growth and Convergence in India’, Finance and Development, 33(1): 49–52.
Chancel, L. and T. Piketty (2017), ‘Indian Income Inequality 1922–2015: From British Raj to Billionaire Raj’, WID World
Working Paper Series No. 2017/11, World Inequality Lab.
Cherodian, R. and A. P. Thirlwall (2015), ‘Regional Disparities in per Capita Income in India: Convergence or Divergence?’,
Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, 37(3): 384–407.
Čihák, M., A. Demirgüç-Kunt, E. Feyen and R., Levine (2012), Benchmarking Financial Development Around the World.
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 6175.
Claessens, S. and E. Perotti (2007), ‘Finance and Inequality: Channels and Evidence’, Journal of Comparative Economics,
35(4): 748–773.
Creane, S., R. Goyal, A. Mobarak and R. Sab (2003), ‘Financial Development in the Middle East and North Africa’, Finance
and Development, 40(1): 28.
Dabla-Norris, E. and N. Srivisal (2013), Revisiting the Link between Finance and Macroeconomic Volatility. IMF Working
Paper 13/29. Washington: International Monetary Fund (January).
Degryse, H. and S. Ongena (2005), ‘Distance, Lending Relationships, and Competition’, Journal of Finance, 60(1): 231–266.
Demirguc-Kunt, A., L. Klapper, S. Ansar and A. Jagati (2017), Making It Easier to Apply for a Bank Account: A Study of the
Indian Market, Policy Research Working Paper. Washington, DC, World Bank.
Demirgüç-Kunt, A., L. Klapper, D. Singer, S. Ansar and J. Hess (2018), The Global Findex Database 2017: Measuring
Financial Inclusion and the Fintech Revolution, Washington, DC: World Bank.
Démurger, S. (2001), ‘Infrastructure Development and Economic Growth: An Explanation for Regional Disparities in
China?’, Journal of Comparative Economics, 29(1): 95–117.
De Soto, H. (2000), The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else, New York: Basic
Books, and London: Bantam Press/Random House.
Dholakia, R. (1994), ‘Spatial Dimension of Acceleration of Economic Growth in India’, Economic and Political Weekly, XXIX
(35), August 21.
Dreze, J. and A. Sen (2013), An Uncertain Glory: India and its Contradictions, London: Allen Lane.
Eichengreen, E. and P. Gupta (2012), The global financial crisis and Indian banks: survival of the fittest? https://mpra.ub.uni-
muenchen.de/43365/1/MPRA_paper_43365.pdf
Esmara, H. (1975), ‘Regional Income Disparities’, Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 11(1): 41–57.
Fafchamps, M. and M. Schündeln (2013), ‘Local Financial Development and Firm Performance: Evidence from Morocco’,
Journal of Development Economics, 103(2013): 15–28.
Felsenstein, D. and B. Portnov (2005), Regional Disparities in Small Countries, Berlin: Springer.
Field, E. (2007), ‘Entitled to Work: Urban Property Rights and Labor Supply in Peru’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122(4):
1561–1602.
Frankel, F. (2005), India’s Political Economy: 1947–2004, New York: Oxford University Press.
Gormley, T. A. (2010), ‘The Impact of Foreign Bank Entry in Emerging Markets: Evidence from India’, Journal of Financial
Intermediation, 19(1): 26–51.
Greif, A. (2006), Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons From Medieval Trade (Political Economy of
Institutions and Decisions), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Holcombe, R. G. and C. J. Boudreaux (2016), ‘Market Institutions and Income Inequality’, Journal of Institutional Economics,
12(2): 263–276.
Hornbeck, R. (2010), ‘Barbed Wire: Property Rights and Agricultural Development’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 125(2):
767–810.
IMF (2020), Public Banks’ Support to Households and Firms, Special Series on Fiscal Policies to Respond to COVID-19,
Fiscal Affairs, International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.
Jalilian, H. and C. Kirkpatrick (2005), ‘Does Financial Development Contribute to Poverty Reduction?’, Journal of
Development Studies, 41(4): 636–656.
Jayaratne, J. and P. E. Strahan (1996), ‘The Finance-Growth Nexus: Evidence From Bank Branch Deregulation’, The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 111(3): 639–670.
Joumard, I., H. Morgavi and H. Bourrousse (2017), Achieving strong and balanced regional development in India, OECD
Economics Department Working Papers, No. 1412, Paris: OECD Publishing, https://doi.org/10.1787/92fd16d9-en.
Kanbur, R. and A. Venables (2005), Spatial Inequality and Development, New York: Oxford University Press.
Kanbur, R. and X. Zhang (2005), ‘Fifty Years of Regional Inequality in China: A Journey through Central Planning, Reform,
and Openness’, Review of Development Economics, 9(1): 87–106.
Kaur, J. and Silony (2011), ‘Penetration and Growth of Banking in Punjab During Post Reforms Era’, International Journal of
Financial Management; New Delhi, 1(4), 23–45.
Kohli, R. (1999), ‘Rural Bank Branches and Financial Reform’, Economic and Political Weekly, Jan. 16–29, Vol. 34, No. 3/4,
Money, Banking and Finance (Jan. 16–29, 1999), pp. 169–174.
Journal of Institutional Economics 21
https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1744137421000291
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 2.97.224.155, on 14 Jul 2021 at 08:44:48, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
Kim, S. (2009), ‘Institutions and US Regional Development: A Study of Massachusetts and Virginia’, Journal of Institutional
Economics, 5(2), 181–205.
Kim, S. (2017), ‘Institutions and US Regional Development: A Study of Massachusetts and Virginia’, Journal of Institutional
Economics (2009), 5(2): 181–205.
Kimura, Y. (2011), Property Rights Improvement and Credit Reallocation: Theory and Evidence from Urban India
Kumar, N. (2013), ‘Financial Inclusion and its Determinants: Evidence From India’, Journal of Financial Economic Policy, 5
(1): 4–19.
Kurian, N. J. (2000), ‘Widening Regional Disparities in India: Some Indicators’, Economic & Political Weekly, 35(7): 538–550.
Levine, R. (1997), ‘Financial Development and Economic Growth: Views and Agenda’, Journal of Economic Literature, 35(2):
688–726.
Mohan, R. and P. Ray (2017), Indian Financial Sector: Structure, Trends and Turns. IMF Working Paper. Washington, DC,
International Monetary Fund.
Narasimham, M. (1991), Report of the Committee on the Financial System (Report). New Delhi: Ministry of Finance,
Government of India.
Narayana, D. (2000), ‘Banking Sector Reforms and the Emerging Patterns in Commercial Credit Deployment in India’,
Review of Development and Change, 5(2): 248–267.
Nayyar, D. (2015), ‘Birth, Life and Death of Development Finance Institutions in India’, Economic & Political Weekly, L(33):
51–60.
Nirola N. and S. Sahu (2019), ‘The Interactive Impact of Government Size and Quality of Institutions on Economic Growth-
Evidence From the States of India’, Heliyon, 5(3), e01352.
OPHI (2017), India Country Briefing, Multidimensional Poverty Index Data Bank. OPHI, University of Oxford. www.ophi.
org.uk/multidimensional-poverty-index/mpi-country-briefings/.
Oura, H. (2008), Financial development and growth in India: a growing tiger in a cage?, IMF Working paper 08/79,
Washington, DC: IMF
Pal, R. (2009), ‘Outreach of Banking Services, Infrastructure Penetration, Labour Regulation and Industrial Growth: Evidence
From Indian States’, Retrieved June 2, 2015, from http://www.igidr.ac.in/conf/money/mfc-11/Pal_Rupayan.pdf.
Panizza, U. (2012), ‘Finance and Economic Development’, International Development Policy, 3(3): 141–160.
Peng, J., J. He, Z. Li, Y. Yi and N. Groenewold (2010), ‘Regional Finance and Regional Disparities in China’, Australian
Economic Papers, 49(4), 301–322.
Pickety, T. (2014), Capital in the Twenty-First Century, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Prager, J. and J. Thisse (2012), Economic Geography and the Unequal Development of Regions, London: Routledge.
Purfield, C. (2006), Mind the Gap- Is Economic Growth in India Leaving Some States Behind?, Washington, D.C.:
International Monetary Fund.
Rajesh Raj, S. N., K. Sen and V. Kathuria (2014), ‘Does Banking Development Matter for New Firm Creation in the Informal
Sector? Evidence From India’, Review of Development Finance, 4(1): 38–49.
Rao, M. (2020), Institutional Factors of Credit Allocation: Examining the Role of Judicial Capacity and Bankruptcy Reforms,
http://manaswinirao.com/files/paper2_dissertation.pdf
Rao, M., R.T. Shand and K.P. Kalirajan (1999), ‘Convergence of Incomes across Indian States – A Divergent View’, Economic
& Political Weekly, 34(13): 769–778.
RBI (2003), Annual Report, 2002–03. Mumbai, India: Reserve Bank of India.
RBI (2005), Report on Trend and Progress of Banking in India 2004–05. Mumbai, India: Reserve Bank of India.
RBI (2008), Report on Currency & Finance 2006–08, Vol. I, Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai.
RBI (2016), Report on Trend and Progress of Banking in India. Mumbai, Reserve Bank of India.
RBI (2020a), Master Directions – Priority Sector Lending (PSL) – Targets and Classification, Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai,
https://www.rbi.org.in/Scripts/BS_ViewMasDirections.aspx?id=11959
RBI (2020b), Report on Trend and Progress of Banking in India. Mumbai, Reserve Bank of India.
Robock, S. H. (1960), ‘Regional and National Economic Development in India’, Papers in Regional Science, 6(1): 65–81.
Sachs, J., N. Bajpai and A. Ramiah (2002), Understanding Regional Economic Growth in India, Cambridge, MA, USA, Center
for International Development, Harvard University: 1–45.
Sarma, M. and J. Pais (2011), ‘Financial Inclusion and Development’, Journal of International Development, 23(5): 613–628.
Sarma, M. and A. Prashad (2016), ‘Do Foreign Banks in India Indulge in “Cream Skimming”?’, Economic & Political Weekly,
LI(12): 120–125.
Sharda, G., N. Swamy and C. Singh (2014), Impact of Foreign Banks on the Indian Economy. Working Paper 451. Indian
Institute of Management, Bangalore.
Sharma, S. (2008), Capital Immobility and Regional Inequality: Evidence from India. Retrieved February 9, 2017, from
https://www.enterprisesurveys.org/∼/media/GIAWB/EnterpriseSurveys/Documents/ResearchPapers/Capital-Immobility-
India.pdf.
Shergill, B. S. and R. Kaur (2019), Rural Economy, State and Public Policy Exploring the Rural Crisis of Indian Punjab,
Economic & Political Weekly, 54: 26–27, 29 Jun.
22 Rashmi U. Arora and P. B. Anand
https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1744137421000291
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 2.97.224.155, on 14 Jul 2021 at 08:44:48, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
Shete, N. B. (2002), ‘Priority Sector Advances of Banks during the Post-Reform Period’, Prajnan, 31(1): 21–37.
Singh, L. and S. Singh (2002), Deceleration of Economic Growth in Punjab: Evidence, Explanation, and a Way-Out,
Economic and Political Weekly, Feb. 9–15, 37: 6, 579–586
Social Progress Index (2017), Social Progress Index: States of India 2017. Retrieved from https://socialprogress.in/wp-content/
uploads/2017/10/SPI_2017_Findings.pdf
Stiglitz, J. (2013), The Price of Inequality, London: Penguin.
Stiglitz, J. (2015), The Great Divide, London: Penguin.
Svirydzenka, K. (2016), Introducing a New Broad-based Index of Financial Development. IMF Working Paper WP/16/5.
Washington, DC, International Monetary Fund.
Tulasi, G., R. Goliat and M. Sethi (2017), ‘Involuntary Exclusion and the Formal Financial Sector’, Economic & Political Weekly,
LII(36): 67–72.
UNDP (2009), Human Development Report 2009: Overcoming Barriers: Human Mobility and Development, New York:
United Nations Development Programme.
Williamson, J. G. (1965), ‘Regional Inequality and the Process of Economic Development: A Description of the Patterns’,
Economic Development and Cultural Change, 13(4): 3–45.
World Economic Forum (2012), Financial Development Report 2012, Davos: World Economic Forum.
Yamamoto, D. (2007), ‘Scales of Regional Income Disparities in the USA, 1955–2003’, Journal of Economic Geography, 8(1):
79–103.
Yeyati, E. L., A. Micco and U. Panizza (2005), ‘State-Owned Banks: Do They Promote or Depress Financial Development and
Economic Growth?’, Background paper prepared for the conference on Public Banks in Latin America: Myths and Reality
Inter-American Development Bank, February 25.
Yeyati, E., A. Micco and U. Panizza (2007), ‘A Reappraisal of State-Owned banks’, Economia, 7(2): 209–247.
Younas, J. (2009), ‘Does Institutional Quality Affect Capital Mobility: Evidence From Developing Countries’, Journal of
Institutional Economics, 5(2): 207–223.
Zeng, D.-Z. (2016), ‘Capital Mobility and Spatial Inequalities in Income and Industrial Location’, The Journal of Economic
Inequality, 14(1): 109–128.
Zhang, Q., R. Arora and S. Colombage (2021), ‘The Determinants of Bank Branch Location in India: An Empirical investi-
gation’, International Journal of Bank Marketing, doi:10.1108/IJBM-07-2020-0395.
Zou, K. and J. He (2018), ‘Intra-Provincial Financial Disparity, Economic Disparity, and Regional Development in China:
Evidence from Prefecture-Level City Data’, Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, 54(13): 3064–3080 (October).
Appendix A
Table A1. Classification of states based on per capita income
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Table A2. Banking development index values
States 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Gujarat 0.289 0.309 0.338 0.381 0.340 0.340 0.308 0.353 0.370 0.402 0.399 0.390 0.400
Haryana 0.283 0.308 0.414 0.305 0.301 0.323 0.297 0.347 0.350 0.370 0.405 0.413 0.388
HP 0.345 0.346 0.361 0.367 0.359 0.369 0.324 0.358 0.357 0.348 0.350 0.354 0.365
Karnataka 0.441 0.454 0.471 0.524 0.471 0.501 0.548 0.625 0.632 0.676 0.692 0.711 0.685
Kerala 0.591 0.582 0.591 0.614 0.563 0.564 0.503 0.562 0.583 0.556 0.567 0.533 0.566
Maharsahtra 0.768 0.772 0.765 0.836 0.780 0.783 0.821 0.837 0.890 0.942 0.967 0.984 0.999
Punjab 0.454 0.470 0.468 0.478 0.458 0.464 0.434 0.480 0.495 0.506 0.505 0.496 0.495
Tamilnadu 0.555 0.576 0.593 0.597 0.534 0.581 0.515 0.641 0.679 0.655 0.666 0.669 0.654
AP 0.296 0.308 0.325 0.376 0.333 0.345 0.311 0.368 0.388 0.415 0.404 0.413 0.429
Arunachal 0.391 0.321 0.155 0.315 0.269 0.141 0.334 0.102 0.142 0.378 0.227 0.216 0.221
Assam 0.140 0.145 0.152 0.130 0.134 0.157 0.164 0.182 0.166 0.162 0.158 0.147 0.144
Bihar 0.183 0.193 0.193 0.263 0.238 0.116 0.072 0.132 0.124 0.089 0.072 0.080 0.065
Jharkhand 0.240 0.264 0.285 0.177 0.300 0.209 0.185 0.192
MP 0.213 0.218 0.223 0.303 0.213 0.169 0.172 0.175 0.180 0.250 0.240 0.224 0.226
Chattisgarh 0.110 0.126 0.135 0.151 0.153 0.142 0.170 0.194
Odishha 0.130 0.114 0.162 0.221 0.166 0.180 0.194 0.203 0.201 0.270 0.248 0.234 0.254
Rajasthan 0.163 0.170 0.171 0.256 0.175 0.282 0.228 0.213 0.226 0.242 0.225 0.232 0.236
UP 0.184 0.192 0.203 0.194 0.198 0.188 0.254 0.222 0.237 0.240 0.236 0.226 0.233
West Bengal 0.390 0.412 0.447 0.374 0.383 0.399 0.350 0.396 0.378 0.375 0.368 0.353 0.322
Manipur 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.001
Meghalaya 0.278 0.257 0.247 0.231 0.240 0.254 0.262 0.281 0.326 0.406 0.451 0.219 0.308
Mizoram 0.327 0.311 0.241 0.255 0.155 0.094 0.099 0.120 0.130 0.382 0.180 0.185 0.255
Nagaland 0.123 0.128 0.099 0.100 0.080 0.089 0.088 0.057 0.078 0.059 0.048 0.095 0.032
Tripura 0.407 0.397 0.406 0.369 0.395 0.330 0.383 0.406 0.366 0.168 0.214 0.143 0.154
J&K 0.436 0.377 0.443 0.413 0.445 0.464 0.411 0.400 0.399 0.392 0.369 0.366 0.347
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Table A3. Banking development index values
States 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Gujarat 0.309 0.278 0.334 0.342 0.352 0.351 0.370
Haryana 0.333 0.350 0.406 0.415 0.413 0.414 0.432
HP 0.398 0.450 0.445 0.456 0.442 0.446 0.473
Karnataka 0.560 0.590 0.601 0.584 0.567 0.569 0.585
Kerala 0.438 0.422 0.476 0.491 0.504 0.507 0.534
Maharsahtra 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.998 0.989
Punjab 0.418 0.390 0.438 0.448 0.455 0.462 0.478
Tamilnadu 0.580 0.633 0.623 0.684 0.728 0.730 0.719
AP 0.484 0.482 0.526 0.550 0.544 0.546 0.198
Arunachal Pradesh 0.218 0.253 0.263 0.281 0.253 0.267 0.259
Assam 0.132 0.131 0.172 0.164 0.138 0.156 0.399
Bihar 0.064 0.113 0.073 0.059 0.111 0.043 0.060
Jharkhand 0.222 0.236 0.239 0.238 0.240 0.229 0.234
MP 0.184 0.174 0.197 0.201 0.186 0.200 0.230
Chattisgarh 0.142 0.154 0.172 0.194 0.147 0.181 0.206
Odishha 0.207 0.215 0.246 0.251 0.275 0.251 0.261
Rajasthan 0.194 0.172 0.211 0.213 0.206 0.190 0.236
UP 0.190 0.165 0.204 0.203 0.179 0.188 0.208
West Bengal 0.399 0.384 0.421 0.420 0.416 0.414 0.415
Manipur 0.102 0.012 0.048 0.055 0.068 0.079 0.076
Meghalaya 0.214 0.264 0.268 0.283 0.282 0.290 0.299
Mizoram 0.210 0.273 0.257 0.286 0.250 0.254 0.307
Nagaland 0.158 0.147 0.153 0.150 0.137 0.142 0.101
Tripura 0.248 0.272 0.255 0.277 0.239 0.244 0.305
J&K 0.406 0.466 0.441 0.462 0.495 0.500 0.500
Source: Computed by the authors.
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